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Abstract 
 
Tax competition and spillover models offer ambiguous predictions concerning the economic 
impact of tax havens on non-tax havens. The implications of tax havens for less developed 
countries (LDCs), in particular, are not well understood and are little studied. This paper 
investigates the impact of tax havens on non-tax haven countries in terms of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). We investigate the importance of agglomeration effects by accounting for the 
level of FDI inflows as well as the role of geography by measuring  proximity to the nearest tax 
haven. Our analysis yields several interesting findings. First, using panel data for 142 countries, 
we find evidence of positive spillovers from tax havens to nearby LDCs, but not to nearby 
developed countries. Second, restricting our panel to LDCs, we find the positive effect of tax 
haven FDI on LDCs to be robust. Third, we find that geographic distance matters for financial 
flows: LDCs which are the closest to a nearby tax haven benefit the most in terms of FDI 
inflows. This result is robust to including a lag of the dependent variable and accounting for 
spatial interdependence of FDI.  We conclude that tax haven activity has beneficial implications 
for FDI inflows of nearby LDCs. 
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Ever-increasing levels of foreign direct investment, the rising R&D intensity of 
multinational firms, and the growing volume of world trade between related parties 
together imply that the demand for tax haven operations is likely to increase over time, as 
are the concerns of non-haven policymakers. (Desai, Foley and Hines, 2006b, p. 530) 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Tax havens are often touted as “parasitic” (Slemrod and Wilson, 2009), “offshore 
pariahs” (Hampton and Christensen, 2002) that flourish at the expense of non-tax haven 
competitors.  Potential negative impacts are argued to be particularly harmful for Less 
Developed Countries (LDCs).
1
  Estimates of LDC annual revenue losses due to tax havens range 
from $15 billion (Gurtner, 2004) to $50 billion (Oxfam, 2000).  Such concerns, fueled by the 
expansion of tax haven activities throughout the world, have spurred numerous anti-tax haven 
initiatives at the international and national levels.  These include the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, European Union’s Harmful Tax Competition Initiative (OECD, 
1998), the United Nations proposed International Tax Organization (Horner, 2001), the G20 
Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System (G20, 2009), the proposed US Stop Tax 
Haven Abuse Act (Tanenbaum, 2009), and the Foreign Affiliates Rules in Canada (Huynh, 
Lockwood and Maikawa, 2007).  
Several scholars predict that anti-tax haven initiatives are unlikely to protect LDCs from 
the harmful impacts of tax haven activities (McLure, 2006; Altshuler, 2006; and Kudrle and 
Eden, 2003).  This gloomy outlook for LDCs, however, overlooks the possibility that tax haven 
activities may create positive spillovers (Altshuler, 2006).  For example, Desai, Foley and Hines 
(hereafter DFH, 2006a) argue that multinational firms translate lower capital costs associated 
with tax haven activities into increased foreign investment in tax havens and non-tax havens.  
                                                 
1 See Kudrle and Eden (2003), McLure (2006), Oxfam (2000) and Gurria (2009) for further discussion.   
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Further, the spillovers are likely to be geographic in nature with positive benefits accruing to 
countries in closer proximity to tax havens (Rose and Speigel, 2007).  Notably, the mechanisms 
by which tax havens influence economic activity in LDCs have been largely ignored in the 
literature.  In a recent review of previous work on tax havens, Hines (2010) concludes that tax 
havens encourage investment in high-tax countries and are likely to promote growth in other 
countries. 
We address this gap by analyzing the effect of tax havens in relation to foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows using a panel data framework for a large sample of LDCs and 
Developed countries (DCs) from 1990 to 2008.  Following DFH (2006b) we account for regional 
agglomeration by including FDI levels in tax havens and following Rose and Spiegel (2007) we 
capture geographic spillovers by considering FDI in the nearest tax haven as well as proximity to 
the nearest tax haven.
2
   
Our analysis suggests that FDI inflows to tax havens are beneficial in terms of FDI for 
LDCs but not for DCs.  We find a significant regional agglomeration effect: FDI inflows in 
LDCs are positively associated with FDI inflows in the nearest tax haven.  In terms of spillover 
effects: LDCs that are at a close distance to a tax haven exhibit higher levels of FDI than those 
LDCs that are more distant.  These findings are robust to several model specifications, such as 
the inclusion of a lag of the dependent variable and consideration of spatial interdependence of 
FDI.  Our findings lend support to claims that positive spillovers may accrue to regional 
neighbors and are influenced by the level of regional agglomeration of FDI.  Accordingly, our 
results are important for informing international tax policy discussions, particularly those 
focused on the negative effects attributed to tax haven activities.   
                                                 
2 DFH (2006b) analyze firm level demand for tax haven operations and Rose and Spiegel (2007) investigate capital 
market features. 
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 The next section summarizes the literature on tax haven impacts on non-tax havens. 
Sections III and IV describe the general empirical specification and discuss the results obtained 
for the full sample (DCs and LDCs) and the sub-sample of LDCs, respectively.  Sections V and 
VI discuss the results obtained for the estimations for the balanced panel of LDCs with spatial 
considerations and the spatial error and lag models. Section VII concludes.  
 
II. Empirical and Theoretical Evidence of Tax Haven Impacts on Non-Tax Havens  
Based on our review of the main threads in the literature related to tax haven activity, we 
draw two important conclusions.  First, the impact of tax haven activity on non-tax haven 
countries as a whole is ambiguous from a theoretical and empirical perspective.  Second, the 
literature does little to distinguish between potential implications for LDCs compared with DCs.   
Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that tax haven activity can be associated 
with both positive and negative spillover effects on non-tax haven countries.
3
  Tax competition 
can lead to negative effects: tax havens are likely to attract capital that would have otherwise 
gone to non-tax havens if taxation policies were equal.  Slemrod and Wilson (2009) present a 
theoretical model in which attempts of national firms to take advantage of reduced corporate 
taxes in tax havens cause capital to flow out of non-tax haven countries.  Tax havens not only 
offer low rates of taxation, but are also likely to offer an environment friendly to foreign capital.  
This makes it easier for multinational corporations (MNCs) to locate operations in tax havens.  
Thus, the presence of tax havens in a given region will influence location decisions of MNCs.  
On the other hand, non-tax havens may be positively impacted if tax haven policies 
enable MNCs to significantly reduce capital costs by increasing foreign investment in tax 
havens.  For instance, Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) estimate that American firms with activity in 
                                                 
3 See Dharmapala (2008) for a discussion. 
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at least one tax haven face a tax rate on pre-tax income that is 1.5 percentage points lower on 
average than firms with no activity in tax havens.  These reductions in capital costs allow MNCs 
to increase investment in non-tax havens (DFH, 2006a; Hong and Smart, 2007).  In fact, DFH 
(2006b) find a positive relationship between the establishment of tax haven subsidiaries and sales 
and investment growth in neighboring non-tax havens.   
In a related vein, Rose and Spiegel (2007) argue that proximity to offshore financial 
centers, which are likely to be tax havens, leads to greater competitiveness in the domestic 
banking sector and financial depth of nearby non-tax haven countries.  They provide empirical 
evidence of this positive spillover in capital markets.  And, while they argue that the importance 
of geography is not obvious for the flow of capital, we content that geographic proximity could 
affect the flow of information about investment opportunities.  In particular, MNCs are more 
likely to become aware of investment opportunities in countries near tax havens that would 
otherwise go unnoticed.  Rose and Spiegel (2007) use distance to the nearest tax haven as an 
instrument for distance to the nearest offshore financial center.  The argument is that activity in 
the nearest tax haven is an important factor in cross-country capital flows.  We follow their 
approach by considering the level of FDI in the nearest tax haven as well as geographic distance.  
The ambiguity of tax haven impacts on LDCs in particular is not addressed in the 
literature.  To the extent that LDCs have fundamentally different economic structures and 
challenges compared with DCs, tax haven activities are likely to be particularly salient for LDCs 
relative to DCs (Bloningen and Wang, 2005).  Tax haven activity could reduce capital inflows to 
a nearby LDC as firms are seduced away by the lower capital costs associated with tax haven 
operations (e.g. a diversion effect).  On the other hand, to the extent that tax haven activity leads 
to increased capital inflows in the surrounding region, MNCs increase investment in nearby 
 5 
countries via a regional agglomeration effect.  Furthermore, the savings in capital costs could 
translate into greater capital inflows to LDCs and the world as a whole via a global 
agglomeration effect.
4
  Finally, the geographical spillovers observed by Rose and Spiegel (2007) 
are likely to be important for LDCs as well.   
Our analysis investigates the channels through which capital inflows in tax havens affect 
capital inflows in non-tax haven, with a particular focus on LDCs.  Following the literature we 
consider agglomeration aspects as measured by FDI levels as well as the role of geographic 
proximity to the nearest tax haven. 
 
III. General Empirical Specification  
We begin by investigating the tax haven consequences for non-tax haven countries, using 
data between 1990 and 2008 for a panel of 142 non-tax haven countries (34 DCs and 108 LDCs; 
see Appendix, Table A1 for a list of countries included).
5
  We limit our panel to non-tax haven 
because the mechanisms through which tax havens attract FDI are likely to be different from 
those of non-tax havens.  Evidence suggests that the common characteristics and low tax rate 
policies of tax havens are associated with higher levels of FDI.  As a result, tax policies are 
suspected to be endogeneous in typical empirical investigations.
6
     
Our general model captures two key aspects of tax haven spillover impacts: regional 
agglomeration and geographic diffusion and is specified as follows: 
  
                                                 
4 A recent study by Chantasasawat et al. (2010) has shown evidence of FDI spillovers effects from China to other 
East Asian countries. While this does not pertain specifically to tax havens, it relates to the potential agglomeration 
effects of FDI that accrue to LDCs when MNCs locate in nearby tax haven countries.  
5 Due to missing observations, the estimations for the full sample are based in an unbalanced panel framework. Non-
tax havens are those countries which are not designated as a tax haven by Dharmapala and Hines (2009). Countries 
are classified as developed and less developed using the World Bank’s Country and Lending Groups classification 
as of September of 2010 (see the website listed in references). 
6De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) and DFH (2004) discuss empirical analyses of FDI response to tax rates. Hines 
(2005) documents the conspicuous degree to which tax havens attract FDI. 
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 FDIit= α1TH_FDIit + α2LDC_DUMMYit + XitBi + εit     (1) 
 
The dependent variable, FDIit, is the natural logarithm of total FDI inflows in US dollars 
(millions) for country i in year t, where t ranges from 1990 to 2008. FDI inflows were obtained 
from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) website. TH_FDI 
is the natural log of FDI inflows in the nearest tax haven to country i in year t.  We estimate 
distance to the nearest tax haven using Mayer’s and Zignago (2006) distance data.7  Listed in 
Appendix, Table A2, the tax haven countries used to calculate TH_FDI include those identified 
by Dharmapala and Hines (2009) for which the distance to other countries and data on FDI is 
available. Our approach to modeling tax haven impacts is similar to that of Rose and Spiegel 
(2007).  
We attribute activity in the nearest tax haven as an important indicator of great FDI 
spillovers to non-tax havens because of the importance of increasing familiarity with the nearby 
non-tax haven country and strategic agglomeration among MNCs. MNCs locating subsidiaries in 
tax havens might feel more comfortable and have more information about investment 
opportunities in nearby countries. In addition, following DFH (2006b), large firms with 
significant intra-firm trade and high R&D are more likely to have tax haven operations. 
Therefore, positive spillovers in terms of FDI flowing to nearby countries are expected to be 
associated with intra-firm trade. DFH (2006b) also find that companies with tax haven operations 
pay lower taxes as a fraction of sales, where the amount saved in taxes might translate into 
higher investment in non-haven affiliates.  Following Rose and Spiegel (2007) we can also allow 
FDI activity in the nearest tax haven to serve as an instrument for financial flows in the area.  
                                                 
7 Mayer and Zignago (2006) use the great circle formula to calculate the distance from the most important cities and 
agglomerations of one country to another (website noted in the references section).  
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Given that geographic proximity matters for cross-country capital flows, we take the nearest tax 
haven to be pertinent for our analysis.  Accordingly, we focus on the nearest tax haven to 
evaluate the direct impact of tax haven operations in relation to strategic agglomeration and 
geographic spillovers. 
In Equation 1, the LDC dummy variable allows LDCs to differ from DCs in relation to 
attracting FDI because of underlying country characteristics.  The vector X represents a set of 
control variables identified in previous empirical analyses as important determinants of FDI.
8
  
The general model includes typical control variables such as the initial level of real GDP, 
population, exchange rate, and trade openness (all in natural logs).
9
  Geographic conditions are 
accounted for by including a landlocked dummy variable, and a set of regional dummy variables 
for Africa, America, Asia, Europe, and Pacific.
10
  Furthermore, we control for institutions by 
including an indicator that measures fiscal freedom and dummies to control for high corruption 
and British legal origin.  Time dummies are also included in all estimations to control for time 
specific variation.
11
 Table 1 describes all the variables used in this analysis and their sources. 
Table 2 (part a) presents the summary statistics for the data corresponding to the full sample of 
countries. 
                                                 
8 Blonigen (2005) presents a comprehensive review of literature related to the determinants of FDI. Biswaz (2002) 
provides another useful review of the determinants of FDI. 
9 Although several empirical analyses use the current level of GDP as a control variable, we use the initial level of 
GDP because FDI and GDP may be simultaneously determined. See Aharonovitz and Miller (2010), Choe (2003), 
Chowdhury and Mavrotas (2006), Hansen and Rand (2006) and Sylwester (2005) for a discussion and empirical 
evidence on the simultaneous determination of FDI and GDP growth. We consider initial levels of real GDP per 
capita in 1990. If data are not available for 1990, we use the earliest available observation for the real GDP per 
capita between 1991 and 1994.  
10 We omit the dummy for African countries in our estimations. 
11 Coefficients for time dummies not included for purpose of space. We do not include country dummies since 
several independent variables are time invariant. The variables includes in the right hand side are controlling for 
specific country characteristics. We take into consideration the cross-country variation for the error term by using 
cross sectional panel corrected standard errors. 
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The model is first estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator with panel 
corrected standard errors (cross section).  By using panel corrected standard errors we control for 
the fact that disturbances are heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels.   
The estimates shown in column 1 of Table 3 correspond to estimation of Equation 1 using the 
full sample of 34 DCs and 108 LDCs.   
In terms of our variable of interest, the estimated coefficient for TH_FDI is found to be 
positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level implying that FDI inflows in the 
nearest tax haven are positively related to FDI in non-tax haven countries.  This finding suggests 
the presence of positive spillovers, even controlling for common regional and other factors 
related to FDI inflows.  As expected, we find that LDCs have lower levels of FDI compared with 
DCs: the estimated coefficient for the LDC dummy is negative and statistically significant at the 
5 percent level. 
The estimated coefficients of the majority of the control variables (initial GDP, 
population, exchange rate, and openness) are significant at the 1 percent level and have the 
expected signs.
12
  In relation to the regional dummies, countries in America and Europe have 
higher levels of FDI relative to countries in the African region (the omitted category) while the 
Asia dummy coefficient is unexpectedly negative and statistically significant. Regarding 
institutional variables, we find that only the indicator of fiscal freedom coefficient to be 
statistically significant (at the 5 percent level or greater), where it has a positive sign. The 
dummy coefficient for high corruption is negative, but marginally significant (10 percent level).  
                                                 
12 Our exchange rate variable is the local currency unit per US dollar. The positive sign of the exchange rate variable 
means that as currency depreciates (you need more of local currency to buy US dollar) then FDI increases. Blonigen 
(2005) presents a good discussion on the effect of exchange rates on FDI. He also provides a good discussion on the 
expected signs of the other variables. 
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We explore whether the effect of tax haven FDI inflows differs for LDCs by including an 
interaction term between the LDC dummy and FDI inflows to the nearest tax haven.  Estimates 
including this interaction term are shown in column 2 of Table 3.  Interestingly, we find that the 
estimated coefficient for the interaction term is positive and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level, while the estimated coefficient for TH_FDI became insignificant.  This provides 
evidence that FDI inflows to tax havens are influential for LDCs but not for DCs.  It also 
suggests that the significance of the estimated coefficient for TH_FDI in the first set of estimates 
(without the interaction term) was primarily driven by the effect on LDCs.  Further, the results 
support the argument that, because LDCs and DCs do not share the same coefficients in FDI 
models (Bloningen and Wang, 2005), pooling them together is inappropriate.  Accordingly, the 
specifications to follow exclude DCs from our sample, allowing us to focus on the impact of tax 
havens on FDI inflows for LDCs in an appropriate fashion.  
 
IV. Estimation Results using LDCs only 
To further investigate the implications of tax haven activity for LDCs, we first estimate 
equation 1 using all available observations for LDCs during the 1990-2008 period (108 
countries, unbalanced panel estimation).  Estimates for the unbalanced panel of LDCs are shown 
in column 3 of Table 3.  The estimated coefficient for TH_FDI is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level, similar to our findings in column 1. 
We estimate our model in a balanced panel framework to obtain more consistent results 
and to allow further exploration into the role of geography.  For the balanced panel of LDCs, we 
restrict our sample to LDCs for which complete data is available, yielding a sample of 94 LDCs 
 10 
with observations between 1995 and 2007.
13
  Summary statistics for the balanced panel 
composed of only LDCs are shown in Table 2 (part b).  Estimates of the balanced panel of LDCs 
are given in column 4 of Table 3.  In this estimation, we observe the estimated coefficient on 
TH_FDI to be positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  Notably, the TH_FDI 
coefficient (0.046) is of similar magnitude to the one obtained for the unbalanced panel of LDCs 
(0.06) as well as the full sample including both DCs and LDCs (0.042).  Looking at the estimates 
shown in column 4 of Table 3, a 1 percent increase in FDI inflows in the nearest tax haven is 
associated with an estimated 0.05 percent increase in FDI on average.
14
 Quantifying this effect in 
US dollar terms using mean values, we find that a 0.38 million dollar or 1 percent increase in 
FDI in the nearest tax haven leads to a predicted 0.03 million dollar or 0.05 percent increase in 
FDI for the average country. This effect can also be expressed as follows: a one dollar increase in 
FDI in the nearest tax haven will lead to a predicted 0.09 dollar increase in FDI in the average 
LDC. Thus, the magnitude of the effect seems significant in terms of FDI inflows for LDCs. 
The coefficients for the control variables were largely similar across the first three 
specifications (Table 3, columns 1, 2, and 3). In the last specification (where we use the balanced 
panel of LDCs; Table 3, column 4) the estimated coefficients for initial GDP, population, and 
openness continue to be positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  In contrast, 
the estimated coefficient for exchange rate switches from positive to negative and becomes 
statistically insignificant.  The control variable coefficients related to institutions are also no 
longer significant. In relation to the regional dummies, the estimated coefficients for America, 
Asia and Europe retain the same signs, but the coefficients for America and Asia are less 
                                                 
13 In some cases, linear interpolation was used to ensure that there were no gaps in the series, allowing us to estimate 
our model in a balanced panel. 
14 All the variations of the model in Table 3 were estimated using a variable that included FDI to nearest tax haven 
weighted by the distance.  Previous results are robust to including the distance weighted tax haven FDI indicator, 
and these results were not include for the purpose of brevity (available upon request). 
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significant. The Pacific dummy becomes negative and significant at the 10 percent in this 
estimation. 
The potential endogeneity of tax haven FDI is an important consideration.  Although it is 
possible that FDI inflows to a LDC drive FDI inflows to nearby tax havens, there is no 
theoretical basis to expect this sort of causality. The essential motivation for investing in a LDC 
is different from that of a tax haven because of country characteristics. As defined by Hines 
(2007), tax havens tend to be small, well governed countries with low tax rates. Thus, FDI 
inflows to LDCs and tax havens are not likely to be endogenously determined. It could be 
argued, however, that positive spillovers in terms of FDI flows from LDCs to tax havens might 
still be present. In this case, an endogeneity test is recommended to determine whether there is 
evidence of endogenous determination of tax haven FDI in our data. 
Following the model specified in column 4 of Table 3, we perform a Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test. Our instrument is the amount of FDI outflows from a LDC. This variable is an 
appropriate instrument for two reasons. First, when regressing TH_FDI on FDI outflows of 
LDCs, we find that FDI outflows in LDCs have a positive and significant effect on TH_FDI 
inflows at the 1 percent level. Furthermore, we find that FDI outflows are not endogenously 
determined because FDI outflows have no significant effect on the residual of the estimation 
shown in column 4 of Table 3. To perform the endogeneity test, we regress our suspected 
endogenous variable, TH_FDI, on all exogenous variables specified in our model and the 
proposed instrument.  The residual from this estimation is included on the right hand side of the 
equation of our model specified in column 4 of Table 3.  We find that the residual is not 
 12 
statistically significant even at the 40 percent level, implying that OLS estimates are consistent 
and there is no endogeneity.
15
 
 
V. Estimation of Balanced Panel of LDCs with Spatial Considerations 
Next we refine our estimations using a balance panel of LDCs.  Results are given in 
Table 4. To further determine the nature of geographic spillovers in our analysis of tax haven 
FDI inflows on LDCs, we construct three dummy variables that account for different levels of 
proximity to the closest tax haven: CLOSE, MEDIUM, and FAR.  The categories create a fairly 
equal distribution of countries among the three groups, where the cut off points are related to the 
mean plus/minus one half the standard deviation.
16
  The MEDIUM dummy variable is the 
omitted category in our estimations, making this group the benchmark.  We also include 
interaction terms of the distance dummies and TH_FDI.  The distance dummies are also 
interacted with TH_FDI to capture geographic diffusion of spillovers.  Positive (negative) 
estimated coefficients of the distance dummies and the interaction term would indicate that 
greater FDI inflows in the nearest tax haven are associated with greater (lower) FDI inflows for 
countries in that distance group compared with the omitted group (countries that are in the 
medium range). 
OLS Estimates in column 1 of Table 4 suggest that the impact of tax haven activities on 
FDI inflows to LDCs comes from both agglomeration and geographic diffusion effects.  In terms 
of the agglomeration, we find that FDI inflows to tax havens have a positive and significant 
                                                 
15 Results for the endogeneity test are not included to conserve space but are available upon request. The estimations 
for the endogeneity test are unbalanced due to missing observations for the instrumental variable (natural log of FDI 
ouflows in US dollars, truncated for negative values with a value close to zero). 
16 See Table 1 for an explanation on how these dummies were constructed. The standard deviation of the distance to 
the nearest tax haven category is almost 71 percent of its mean value. Thus, using half standard deviation allows for 
a more equal distribution of countries among groups. 
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effect (at 5 percent level) on LDC FDI inflows.  In relation to geographic diffusion, the positive 
coefficient for the TH_CLOSE and its statistical significance at the 5 percent level suggest that 
LDCs within a close distance of a tax haven experience higher levels of FDI inflows than those 
that are in the medium range, ceteris paribus.  The coefficient on TH_FAR is smaller and is 
marginally significant (significance at the 10 percent level) suggesting that LDCs with a distant 
tax haven do not seem to benefit more than those LDCs with a tax haven in the medium range.  
Taken together this suggests that a proximity premium accrues to the LDCs within a close range 
of a tax haven.  In this estimation, a 1 percent increase in FDI to the nearest tax haven is 
associated with an increase in FDI of 0.12 percent.  On average, LDCs with the nearest tax haven 
in the close range have 109 percent higher levels of FDI than those LDCs with a tax haven in the 
medium range.  The impact of tax haven proximity seems to have an effect of significant 
magnitude under this estimation. 
To check for the robustness of our estimations for the balanced panel of LDCs, it is 
important to consider other factors that relate to regional capital inflows.  For example, if our 
previous findings are just representative of omitted, underlying regional factors, then the 
estimated effects of tax haven activity could be biased.  Accordingly, we estimate our model of 
FDI for the balanced panel including the lag of the dependent variable.  Including the lag of the 
dependent variable, corrects for autocorrelation, where there is the possibility that FDI inflows to 
the nearest tax haven might be just capturing FDI inflows to a specific geographic region or 
country.   
OLS estimates including the lag of the dependent variable are shown in column 2 of 
Table 4.  While the estimated coefficient for the lag of the dependent variable is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, the estimated TH_FDI coefficient becomes 
 14 
insignificant.  The estimated coefficient for TH_CLOSE, however, continues to be positive and 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  These estimates support Rose and Spiegel’s (2007) 
conclusion that geographic diffusion matters.  In particular, we estimate that countries with a 
nearby tax haven have levels of FDI that are 83 percent higher, even controlling for lagged 
values of FDI and for the level of FDI in the nearest tax haven.  
 
VI. Estimation with Spatial Error and Spatial Lag 
Finally, we investigate the potential for spatial interdependence of FDI.  Specifically, we 
estimate a model that considers structural instability in the form of non-constant error variances.  
The spatial error model corrects for the potential bias resulting from the possibility that FDI 
inflows in one country may be dependent on the FDI inflows of nearby countries.
17
  This model 
is recommended when spatial dependence is expected in the disturbance term because the OLS 
estimator is no longer efficient and provides biased standard errors (Anselin, 1988, 1999).  
The error term in the spatial error model is specified as λWε + ui,t, where λ represents the 
coefficient for the spatially correlated error and W, which is the weighting matrix, is an NxN 
symmetric matrix that represent proximity between country i and country j.  For the spatial error 
model in a panel framework, following Bloningen et al. (2007), W is composed by TxT matrices 
of dimension IxI (T=time periods, I=countries). In this estimation, W is a diagonal matrix where 
there are 26 matrices of dimension 94x94 in the main diagonal (W is a 1222x1222 matrix). The 
elements of the diagonal matrices are constructed in a way where the inverse of the distance from 
country i to country j is used for all non-diagonal terms and zeros for the diagonal terms.  
Elements of the diagonal matrices are weighted so that one element of the matrix is equal to 1 for 
                                                 
17 Refer to Kelejian and Prucha (1999) and Kapoor et al. (2007) for a discussion of the problems that arise when 
errors are spatially correlated. 
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the two countries with the shortest bilateral distance, and all the other non-diagonal elements of 
the matrix are decreasing as distance increases.
18
  
We also consider spatial interdependence by estimating a spatial lag model by including a 
spatially lagged dependent variable on the right hand of the equation.
19
  A spatial autoregressive 
term is included as an independent variable. The spatial autoregressive parameter is specified as 
ρWyFDIi,t , where W represents the same weighting matrix described above and ρ is the 
parameter to be estimated to account for the spatial autocorrelation of FDI. 
The spatial error and lag models are estimated with the maximum likelihood estimator 
(MLE) and W is normalized so that each row sums to unity.
20
  The Lagrange multiplier test will 
be used to determine whether errors are spatially correlated (spatial error) or there is a spatial 
autocorrelation (spatial lag).
21
 When comparing which model is more adequate, the model that 
gives the largest value for the Lagrange multiplier test statistic is preferred (Anselin, 2005).  
The estimates obtained when using MLE estimation and allowing for spatial correlation 
of the error term and spatial autocorrelation are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, 
respectively.  For the spatial error model (column 3), we find evidence of a spatially correlated 
error term from the Lagrange multiplier test: we reject the hypothesis that the error term is not 
spatially correlated (Ho: λ=0) at the 1 percent level.  These estimates are similar to previous 
ones.  We find that the estimated coefficient for TH_FDI is positive and statistically significant 
at the 10 percent level. The estimated TH_CLOSE remains positive and statistically significant at 
                                                 
18 For the non-diagonal terms in the diagonal matrices of the W matrix, we use the distance between the most 
important cities and agglomerations in countries (provided by Mayer and Zignago, 2006). See Blonigen et al. (2007) 
for further explanation on the construction of the W matrix. 
19 Blonigen et al. (2007) empirically analyze the determinants of FDI and find that there is spatial interdependence. 
They use a spatial lag model since they are interested in determining the existence and the nature of spatial 
interdependence.  
20 Our MLE estimates show robust standard errors since the estimator of variance uses the Huber/White estimator 
instead of the traditional calculation. 
21 Refer to LeSage (1999) for a discussion on how to estimate the spatial error and lag models and how to test for the 
presence of spatially correlated errors and spatial autocorrelation. 
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the 5 percent level, where LDCs with the nearest tax haven in close range have a predicted 123 
percent higher level of FDI compared with LDCs whose nearest tax haven is in the medium 
range. Quantifying the effect of in dollar terms, we compare LDCs with a tax haven in the close 
range with LDCs with a tax haven in the medium range using the coefficients from the spatial 
error model and mean values. We find that LDCs with a tax haven in the close range have on 
average a 270 million dollars more in FDI  than those LDCs with a tax haven in the medium 
range. 
The estimates for the spatial lag model are shown in column 4 of Table 4.  Again, we 
reject the null that FDI is not spatially autocorrelated (Ho: ρ=0).  The results suggest that our 
previous estimates of tax haven impacts and proximity are robust.  Similar to the spatial error 
results, the estimated TH_FDI coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level. The estimated TH_CLOSE coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 5 
percent. Investigation of the Lagrange multiplier test results, suggest that the spatial error model 
is preferred to the spatial lag model. 
To summarize, our analysis supports the argument that tax haven activity creates positive 
FDI spillovers to LDCs.  Out of the eight estimations presented in this paper, the estimated 
impact of FDI in the nearest tax haven is found to be statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
in 5 specifications, and significant at the 10 percent level in 2 specifications.  Furthermore, the 
dummy variable for close proximity to the nearest tax haven has a statistically significant impact 
at the 5 percent level in all the estimations included.  We address potential endogeneity of tax 
haven FDI inflows and FDI autocorrelation. Our estimations give credence to the spatial error 
and spatial autocorrelation specifications and alleviate concern that estimated impacts reflect 
potentially omitted regional effects. Interestingly, these spatial models suggest that LDCs that are 
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within a close range of the nearest tax haven display higher levels of FDI in all estimations.  
These findings are consistent with the arguments found in the literature concerning the potential 
for positive spillovers to accrue to LDCs as a result of tax haven activities and highlight the 
importance of geographic location.   
 
VII. Conclusion 
Using a panel data framework and a variety of estimation procedures, the empirical 
analysis developed in this paper suggests that FDI activity in tax havens leads to greater FDI in 
nearby non-tax haven countries, and that impacts on LDCs are likely to differ from impacts on 
DCs.  We find that the overall spillover effects of tax havens are greater for LDCs with a tax 
haven nearby compared with LDCs which are situated farther from the nearest tax haven.  This 
finding runs contrary to the popular argument that tax haven activity is likely to be especially 
damaging to LDCs.   
Looking at our particular sample and focusing on the role of proximity to a given tax 
haven we can see how there might be important spillover effects at play. Taking the tax haven of 
Belize, for example, we observe that El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua 
benefit in terms of FDI by being in close proximity to Belize. Furthermore, in relation to another 
tax haven in Latin America, say Panama, we also observe that some countries might accrue 
greater FDI spillovers by being in closer proximity than others. Colombia, Costa Rica and 
Ecuador are in the close range to Panama, while Bolivia, Chile and Peru are in the middle and far 
range. 
Our results warrant a few caveats.  In contrast to typical tax haven studies where 
exogeneity of FDI is problematic, the FDI inflows to tax havens are likely to be exogenous to 
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FDI inflows of non-tax haven LDCs as discussed before.  Even if tax havens are drawn to areas 
with an agglomeration of FDI activity (DFH 2006b), this activity is not likely driven by non-tax 
haven LDC activity.  To the extent that it affects our results, we argue that it may not be the tax 
haven per se that drives the spillovers, but rather the effect of being in a FDI-rich region.  We 
mitigate omitted bias concerns by including regional dummies and institutional features, and by 
correcting for autocorrelation, spatial error correlation, and spatial autocorrelation.  While we 
address endogeneity in our analysis, omitted variable bias may still be present.  In addition, the 
exact form of spatial diffusion of tax haven impacts is unknown.  Accordingly, the precise nature 
of geographic diffusion warrants further investigation. 
Notably, our general conclusions are based on a single outcome measure, FDI inflows.  
To the extent that FDI inflows are related to growth outcomes (Hansen and Rand, 2006; Oliva 
and Rivera-Batiz, 2002), our results suggest that there is a positive neighborhood effect for 
LDCs.  The importance of proximity to tax havens, however, is likely to have differential 
impacts on other outcome measures, particularly those that more closely capture welfare 
measures.  For such outcomes, it is possible that tax competition factors could be more important 
than spillover influences for LDCs. Our analysis provides a starting point for such future 
investigations. 
From a policy perspective, we support Altshuler’s (2006) suggestion that the limited 
ability of LDCs to combat tax haven policies in other countries need not doom LDCs to a bleak 
future.  That is, if indeed the net overall benefits to multinational firms result in greater capital 
investments in non-tax havens, including LDCs, then there is a potential that LDCs may fare 
better with the tax haven crumbs that spill over to them than they would in a world with less tax 
haven activity.  In such a scenario, LDCs should design policy with the goal of reaping 
 19 
additional benefits from tax haven proximity.  Policies such as improving the regulatory 
environment, making it easier to do business, reducing red tape, and increasing transparency 
might allow LDCs to benefit the most from potential positive spillovers derived from tax haven 
proximity.  We conclude that tax havens appear to be good neighbors for LDCs in terms of FDI 
inflows. 
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 Table 1. Variable description and source 
 Variable description and source 
FDI Natural log of FDI inflows in millions of US dollars. Negative values are 
imputed using a number close to zero (1e-10). Source: UNCTAD (2010) 
TH_FDI Natural log of FDI inflows to the closest tax haven, in millions of US 
dollars. Negative values are imputed using a number close to zero (1e-
10). Source: UNCTAD (2010) 
TH_distance Natural log of the distance to the closest tax haven in kilometers (tax 
havens are those countries defined by Dharmapala and Hines (2009), see 
table A2). Distance is calculated with the latitudes and longitudes of the 
most important cities and agglomerations. Source: Mayer and Zignago 
(2006) 
Distance dummies: 
CLOSE,              
MEDIUM, and  
FAR 
Dummies are constructed using the distance to the closest tax haven, by 
grouping countries using the mean plus and minus one half of the 
standard deviation. FAR is equal to 1 if the distance to the closest tax 
haven is greater or equal to 2875 kilometers, and zero otherwise. 
MEDIUM is equal to 1 if the distance to the closest tax haven is less than 
2875 but greater than 1369 kilometers, and zero otherwise. CLOSE is 
equal to 1 if the distance to the closest tax haven is lesser or equal to 1369 
kilometers, and zero otherwise.  
GDP_initial Natural log of the initial level of real GDP per capita at the beginning of 
the period (constant 2000 US dollars). When it was not available for the 
full sample, we use the available value between 1991 and 1995. Source: 
WDI (2010) 
Population Natural log of population. Source: WDI (2010) 
Exchange_rate Natural log of exchange rate (LCU per US$). Source: WDI (2010) 
Openness Natural log of exports plus imports divided by real GDP. Source: WDI 
(2010). 
Landlocked 
 
Dummy equal to 1 for landlocked countries, and equal to zero otherwise. 
Source: Mayer and Zignago (2006). 
Regional_dummies Set of dummies equal to 1 for countries in Africa, America, Asia, Europe, 
and Pacific, respectively. Source: Mayer and Zignago (2006)   
Corruption Equal to 1 if a country has an index of control of corruption one standard 
deviation below the mean, and equal to zero otherwise (average from 
1996 to 2008). Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009)   
British_legal_origin  Dummy equal to 1 if the country has a British legal origin, and zero 
otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. (1999) 
Fiscal_freedom Average of the fiscal freedom index using available observations (1995 to 
2006). Index takes into consideration tax on individual and corporate 
income and tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. Source: Heritage 
Foundation (2010) 
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Table 2A. Summary statistics – Full sample (DCs and LDCs) 
            
   Mean  Max.  Min.  Std. Dev.  Obs. 
FDI 4.1970 12.6902 -23.0259 6.8791 2629 
TH_FDI 3.1808 11.6927 -23.0259 8.3513 2677 
TH_Distance 7.1812 8.6480 4.4537 0.8582 2698 
LDC 0.7606 1.0000 0.0000 0.4268 2698 
GDP_initial 7.2981 10.4154 4.8604 1.4819 2679 
Population 16.0135 21.0044 11.1563 1.7173 2695 
Exchange_rate 2.9630 9.6991 -19.8478 3.0579 2601 
Openness 4.2276 5.6470 2.3824 0.4969 2635 
Landlocked 0.2254 1.0000 0.0000 0.4179 2698 
High_corruption 0.0634 1.0000 0.0000 0.2437 2698 
British_legal_origin 0.2817 1.0000 0.0000 0.4499 2698 
Fiscal_freedom 69.7271 99.9000 32.6805 12.5826 2698 
Summary statistics constructed with available data between 1990 and 2008 for 142 countries 
(34 DCs and 108 LDCs). In terms of regional location, 48 of the sample are in Africa, 23 in 
America, 34 in Asia, 30 in Europe, and 7 in the Pacific.  
 
 
 
Table 2B. Summary statistics – Balanced panel of LDCs  (Obs=1222) 
          
   Mean  Max.  Min.  Std. Dev. 
FDI 4.4530 11.3329 -23.0259 5.6696 
TH_FDI 3.6308 11.6927 -23.0259 6.8916 
TH_Distance 7.3760 8.6480 5.6201 0.7998 
GDP_initial 6.6432 8.8814 4.7446 1.0548 
Population 16.1737 20.9993 11.2293 1.7278 
Exchange_rate 3.9570 10.1266 -5.8962 2.6814 
Openness 4.2573 5.5323 2.6928 0.4874 
Landlocked 0.2447 1.0000 0.0000 0.4301 
High_corruption 0.1170 1.0000 0.0000 0.3216 
British_legal_origin 0.2766 1.0000 0.0000 0.4475 
Fiscal_freedom 72.0338 91.4465 39.9587 9.9583 
Country locations are as follows: 42 in Africa, 19 in America, 22 in Asia, 9 in 
Europe, and 2 in the Pacific.  Regarding proximity, 38 countries are in the closest 
range, 29 in the medium range, and 27 in the far range.  For balanced panel we 
use linear interpolation when there are missing observations.
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Table 3. General Estimations 
  
Independent Variable 
(1)  
Full sample 
DCs and LDCs 
(2) 
Full Sample 
DCs and LDCs 
(3) 
LDCs  
Unbalanced panel 
(4) 
LDCs 
Balanced panel 
            
TH_FDI 0.042 (0.020) ** -0.022 (0.030)  0.060 (0.024) *** 0.046 (0.023) ** 
LDC -1.153 (0.484) ** -1.558 (0.490) ***      
TH_FDI*LDC    0.091 (0.036) **       
GDP_initial 0.578 (0.140) *** 0.577 (0.140) *** 0.758 (0.192) *** 0.545 (0.165) *** 
Population 1.564 (0.152) *** 1.556 (0.152) *** 1.492 (0.165) *** 1.097 (0.140) *** 
Exchange_rate 0.151 (0.058) *** 0.151 (0.058) *** 0.138 (0.069) ** -0.122 (0.080) 
Openness 2.489 (0.416) *** 2.480 (0.409) *** 2.375 (0.453) *** 0.871 (0.325) *** 
Landlocked -0.417 (0.365)  -0.401 (0.370)  -0.544 (0.438) -0.531 (0.571) 
High_corruption -0.904 (0.535) * -0.953 (0.539) * -0.909 (0.562) -0.424 (0.450) 
British_legal_origin 0.351 (0.287)  0.343 (0.285)  0.299 (0.303) -0.038 (0.219) 
Fiscal_freedom 0.028 (0.013) ** 0.025 (0.013) * 0.061 (0.018) *** 0.010 (0.020) 
America 1.663 (0.390) *** 1.643 (0.399) *** 0.975 (0.388) ** 0.943 (0.540) * 
Asia -1.035 (0.335) *** -1.077 (0.333) *** -1.009 (0.383) *** -0.551 (0.298) * 
Europe 1.645 (0.410) *** 1.588 (0.418) *** 1.094 (0.303) *** 1.008 (0.293) *** 
Pacific 1.032 (1.020)  1.015 (1.013)  0.236 (1.201) -2.353 (1.388) * 
Constant -37.619 (4.152) *** -36.906 (4.112) *** -40.484 (4.873) *** -20.964 (4.012) *** 
             
R-squared 0.224   0.226   0.214   0.176  
Observations 2492   2492   1888   1222  
Number of Countries 142     142     108     94    
OLS estimates with panel corrected standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent 
level, respectively. The dependent variable is total FDI inflows. Time dummies included in all estimations. 
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Table 4.  Estimations Related to Space (Balance Panel of LDCs)  
Independent Variable 
(1) OLS  
Panel corrected  
standard errors 
(2) OLS  
Panel corrected  
standard errors 
(3) MLE 
Spatial Error 
robust errors 
(4) MLE 
Spatial Lag 
robust errors 
TH_FDI 0.119 (0.059) ** 0.082 (0.053) 0.117 (0.071) * 0.119 (0.071) * 
TH_close 1.093 (0.463) ** 0.829 (0.423) ** 1.235 (0.616) ** 1.191 (0.612) ** 
TH_far 0.995 (0.529) * 0.939 (0.515) * 0.994 (0.732) 0.936 (0.722) 
TH_FDI*TH_close -0.097 (0.069) -0.062 (0.062) -0.095 (0.078) -0.096 (0.078) 
TH_FDI*TH_far -0.102 (0.072) -0.095 (0.068) -0.087 (0.081) -0.094 (0.081) 
FDI_lag    0.352 (0.095) ***       
GDP_initial 0.577 (0.190) *** 0.315 (0.242) 0.517 (0.285) * 0.537 (0.276) ** 
Population 1.038 (0.136) *** 0.600 (0.164) *** 1.032 (0.131) *** 1.001 (0.129) *** 
Exchange_rate -0.132 (0.083) -0.115 (0.074) -0.134 (0.093) -0.141 (0.092) 
Openness 0.688 (0.329) ** 0.215 (0.362) 0.795 (0.374) ** 0.708 (0.357) ** 
Landlocked -0.600 (0.614) -0.727 (0.513) -0.696 (0.478) -0.623 (0.470) 
High_corruption -0.203 (0.465) 0.208 (0.357) -0.293 (0.515) -0.231 (0.507) 
British_legal_origin -0.040 (0.189) -0.094 (0.189) 0.138 (0.354) 0.076 (0.329) 
Fiscal_freedom 0.011 (0.019) 0.003 (0.017) 0.012 (0.018) 0.008 (0.018) 
America 0.686 (0.520) 0.484 (0.551) 0.756 (0.464) * 0.693 (0.451) 
Asia -0.383 (0.327) -0.162 (0.441) -0.441 (0.514) -0.442 (0.479) 
Europe 1.042 (0.382) *** 0.830 (0.420) ** 0.884 (0.420) ** 0.930 (0.378) *** 
Pacific -1.447 (1.535) -1.181 (1.836) -1.794 (1.846) -1.752 (1.770) 
Constant -20.218 (4.060) *** -10.164 (4.610) ** -18.835 (4.540) *** -18.548 (4.346) *** 
Lambda/Rho       0.228 (0.098) ** 0.180 (0.088) ** 
Lagrange mult. test (prob)       6.163 (0.01)  5.007 (0.03)  
             
R-squared/Log-likelihood 0.180  0.286  -3729.198  -3729.896  
Observations 1222    1128    1222    1222   
MLE estimates in columns 3 and 4 with robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 
percent level, respectively. The dependent variable is total FDI inflows. Time dummies included in all estimations. 
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Appendix:  
Table A1. Country Sample 
  LDCs (n=108)     DCs (n=34) 
Albania Gabon Niger   Australia 
Algeria Gambia, The Nigeria   Austria 
Angola Georgia Pakistan   Canada 
Argentina Ghana Papua New Guin.   Croatia 
Armenia Guatemala Paraguay   Czech Republic 
Azerbaijan Guinea Peru   Denmark 
Bangladesh Guinea-Bissau Philippines   Equatorial Guin. 
Belarus Guyana Romania   Estonia 
Benin Honduras Russian Fed.   Finland 
Bhutan India Rwanda   France 
Bolivia Indonesia Senegal   Germany 
Botswana Iran, Islamic Rep. Seychelles   Greece 
Brazil Jamaica Sierra Leone   Hungary 
Bulgaria Kazakhstan Solomon Islands   Iceland 
Burkina Faso Kenya South Africa   Israel 
Burundi Kiribati Sri Lanka   Italy 
Cambodia Kyrgyz Republic Sudan   Japan 
Cameroon Lao PDR Suriname   Korea, Rep. 
Cape Verde Lesotho Swaziland   Kuwait 
Cen. African Rep. Libya Syrian Arab Rep.   Latvia 
Chad Lithuania Tajikistan   New Zealand 
Chile Macedonia, FYR Tanzania   Norway 
China Madagascar Thailand   Oman 
Colombia Malawi Togo   Poland 
Comoros Malaysia Tonga   Portugal 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Mali Tunisia   Saudi Arabia 
Congo, Rep. Mauritania Turkey   Slovak Republic 
Costa Rica Mauritius Turkmenistan   Slovenia 
Cote d'Ivoire Mexico Uganda   Spain 
Djibouti Moldova Ukraine   Sweden 
Dominican Rep. Mongolia Uruguay   Trin. and Tob. 
Ecuador Morocco Uzbekistan   United Arab Em. 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Mozambique Venezuela, RB   United Kingdom 
El Salvador Namibia Vietnam   United States 
Ethiopia Nepal Yemen, Rep.    
Fiji Nicaragua Zambia     
Italics indicate the 15 LDCs which were not included in the balanced panel estimation.  
Note: Haiti was not included in the initial estimation with all countries due to unavailability 
of data for the early 1990s, but was included in the balanced panel estimation. 
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Table A2. Tax havens (N= 34) 
Anguilla  Gibraltar  Montserrat 
Antigua & Barbuda  Grenada  Netherlands Antilles 
Bahamas  Hong Kong  Panama 
Bahrain  Ireland  Singapore 
Barbados  Jordan  St. Kitts and Nevis 
Belize  Lebanon  St. Lucia 
Bermuda  Liberia  St. Vincent & Gren. 
British Virgin Is.  Luxembourg  Switzerland 
Cayman Islands  Macao  Turks & Caicos Islands 
Cook Islands  Maldives  Vanuatu 
Cyprus  Malta   
Dominica  Marshall Islands  
Tax havens used to compute tax haven distance and FDI inflows to closest tax 
haven variables. 
